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The article deals with the concept of “decision” related with the concept of “crisis” in Carl Schmitt’s 
thought. In the first part of the paper, I try to show why Carl Schmitt could be considered a “thinker of 
the crisis”, through the analysis of two of his major books: Die Diktatur (1921) and Politische The-
ologie (1922). In the second part, I show why “crisis” and “decision” are related in Schmitt’s doctrine. 
In the last part, I try to give a counter-reading of Schmitt’s decisionism through two literary charac-
ters: Bartleby the Scrivener and Mullah Nasrr Eddin. In this final part, the article discusses whether 
Giorgio Agamben’s theory of power can offer an adequate counterbalance for the dominant decisionist 
approach to the politics. My aim is to show how only an indecisionist approach could refuse the lexicon 
of the “crisis” in which our society lives.
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Etymology
In an important article published in the 
Journal of the History of Ideas, Reinhart 
Koselleck wrote, speaking about the term 
“crisis”:
For the Greeks the term ‘‘crisis’’ had relatively 
clearly demarcated meanings in the spheres 
of law, medicine, and theology. The concept 
imposed choices between stark alternatives – 
right or wrong, salvation or damnation, life 
or death. Until the early modern period 
the medical meaning, which continued to 
be used technically, remained dominant 
virtually without interruption (Koselleck 
2006: 358).
Careful etymological research connects 
the term “crisis” to the Greek word Krino, 
indicating the act of separating. In this 
sense, crisis is the moment of separation, 
i.e. the point when a stable condition 
dramatically mutates its order. This is 
the meaning of “crisis” that is used in the 
current economic vocabulary, and it does 
not indicate instability exclusively, but also 
(and foremost) the jeopardized conditions 
of global markets and of the financial 
world in general. The same social meaning 
of “crisis”, according to which we name 
something “social crisis”, comes from the 
semantic field of medicine, and it indicates 
the point of sickness in which the life of the 
patient is most in danger and therefore, on 
a social plan, the point at which the life or 
death of a sick society is decided. First the 
Corpus Ippocraticum and then Galen passed 
down to the tradition of the “medical” 
meaning of the word “crisis”. That was how 
Hippocrates could refer to crisis as to the 
status that follows a symptom (Epidemiae, 
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I 14) and that precedes the healing or the 
decease of the patient. A further step in this 
etymological research shows how the Greek 
verb Krino, “to separate”, can figuratively be 
equivalent to the Latin verb cernere, which 
means “to decide”. Crisis in this sense is not 
only terminologically, but also conceptually 
close to the concept of decision. Thinking 
about the Christian use of the term crisis, 
which indicates both a “religious crisis” 
like the conversion of St. Paul described in 
the Acts of the Apostles, through medical 
terminology (Acts IX, 1-9); and the “crisis” 
of this world, meaning the moment in 
which God will judge the creation. Krisis 
in this sense has the same value as iudicium, 
an affinity that will programmatically be 
adopted by Kant’s Kritik: the “critique” 
of reason will coincide with the judgment 
expressed on it by the “tribunal of reason”. 
Moreover, always from an etymological 
point of view, it is easy to see how “decide” 
comes from caedere, indicating the act of 
cutting (Silvas caedere), which in its Sanskrit 
version literally means “to shatter” (Khad-
ayami). So, crisis and decision belong to 
the same semantic area. The author that 
investigated the most on the conceptual 
closeness of crisis and decision was the 
German jurist Carl Schmitt. Schmitt was 
a controversial thinker, most of all for his 
political theories and positions (it is known 
that he compromised with the Nazi regime 
to which he formally adhered on the May 
1st, 1933). He was one of the most impor-
tant representatives of the juridical science 
of the 20th Century (Galli 1996; 2010). 
The present article has three goals: first of 
all, to explain why Schmitt’s thought can 
be considered “a thought of the crisis”; 
secondly, to analyze the concept of decision 
in Schmitt’s work, and thirdly, to propose 
some counter-readings to the proposal of 
Schmitt.
Carl Schmitt as a thinker of the crisis
There are two main reasons why Schmitt’s 
thought can be well defined as a “thought 
of the crisis”. The first one, historical and 
probably less interesting, has already been 
expressed implicitly: the troubled and tragic 
period Schmitt lived in, i.e. the years of 
World War II, forced the German thinker 
to consider the problem of the historical 
moment, a consideration that was pretty 
common in the European intellectual en-
vironment of that time. As a matter of 
fact, living in the moment of a deep crisis 
indelibly marks the intellectual path of a 
thinker. This is what Schmitt shares with 
the philosophers and thinkers that were 
active between the Twenties and the Fifties 
of the 20th Century. The second point, 
which I am going to deepen in this essay, is 
exclusively theoretical. We can affirm that 
Schmitt makes the concepts of crisis and 
decision his landmarks, or, in other terms, 
Schmitt’s philosophy cannot be understood 
but starting from his reflections about crisis 
and decision-making.
The first example of this reflection in 
Schmitt’s work is the text of 1921, Die 
Diktatur. As he considered the historical 
period Europe went through between the 
16th and the 17th Century, a period that 
was characterized by bloody civil wars, 
Schmitt tried to find an answer about 
how a political system could withstand the 
shock of a hostile tension of two powers, 
a situation we could define as “critic” in 
the Hippocratic sense of the term. The 
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outcome of this hostile situation is noth-
ing but the survival of the political system. 
In this frame, which can be defined as the 
exceptional moment that breaks the veil of 
the monotonous string of the history, the 
exception as the crystallization of a crisis 
situation stands out as the element that 
allows, although in great contrasts, the 
survival of the political world. Therefore, far 
from being considered as a mere contingent 
moment, a momentous wavelet of the order 
tamed in the rationally unfounded plot of 
facts of history, it assumes the original form 
of the politician and becomes its matrix 
and fundamental category. The excep-
tion, in this sense, represents the category 
through which it is possible to evaluate, 
comprehend, and analyze a crisis situation 
that could not be evaluated otherwise, as 
it is purely factual. This is like saying that, 
unlike Kelsen’s theory (1960), the specific 
character of exceptionality consists in being 
an absolutely formal political and juridical 
category. As he wrote in the following year 
in its Politische Theologie, “The exception 
is more interesting than the rule. The rule 
proves nothing; the exception proves every-
thing: it confirms not only the rule but also 
its existence, which derives only from the 
exception” (Schmitt 1985: 22).
In this perspective, it looks evident why, 
according to Schmitt, the phenomenon 
of the dictatorship assumes a particular 
theoretical and political relevance. As a 
matter of fact, a dictatorship intervenes 
when the state of crisis shows the normative 
powerlessness of the current juridical sys-
tem, and as a consequence it authorizes an 
extraordinary event to re-establish the social 
order. In particular, the specific aspect of 
Schmitt’s thought consists in the individu-
ation of two different kinds of dictatorship: 
the commissary and the sovereign ones. The 
first one has a defined mandate that must be 
carried out in a stable political and juridical 
situation, while the second one contains a 
far more personalistic and undetermined 
essence at the time. Schmitt defines it as fol-
lows: “Sovereign dictatorship sees in all the 
existent order a condition to be completely 
removed by action. It does not suspend a 
living constitution by leveraging the law it 
foresees, which is therefore constitutional, 
but aims at creating a condition in which it 
is possible to impose a constitution that is 
believed to be the authentic one” (Schmitt 
1978: 137). 
Therefore, while on the one hand the 
commissary dictatorship conceives the 
sovereign action within the frame of a 
pre-set power, no matter how weakly it is 
perceived by society, on the other hand, 
sovereign dictatorship revolves around the 
power’s possibility of determining a new 
political order. The core theory of sovereign 
dictatorship allows Schmitt to define a 
field of action in which it is possible for 
the constituent power to take a concrete 
action and overcome the chaos and anomie 
the crisis brings within. It is interesting 
to underline the importance of the final 
part of this text, in which Schmitt deals 
exclusively with article 48 of the Weimar 
constitution. He debates it discussing the 
problem of the martial law, i.e. of “the de 
facto military intervention” which creates a 
“sort of lawless situation in which the execu-
tive power, i.e. the army that intervenes, can 
act without respecting the legal bondings 
according to the necessities imposed by 
the circumstances to repress the enemy” 
(Schmitt 1978: 172). Schmitt affirms that 
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this right is not a particular kind of law, but 
its very suspension and substitution with “a 
process that is essentially guided by the ne-
cessity of reaching a given scope” (Schmitt 
1978: 172). It is important to underline the 
purely factual essence of the intervention in 
case of crisis, which must not, in any case, 
become law. “The purely factual measure”, 
Schmitt says, “remains inaccessible to any 
rightful consideration” (Schmitt 1978: 
175). Sticking to the point, we can affirm 
that the crisis condition that through its 
concrete factuality justifies the procedures 
that do not belong to the standard law sys-
tem, determines an exceptional condition, 
a state of exception (Ausnahmezustand). 
We may say that, in this condition, the 
agents perfectly coincide with those who 
judged the conditions of the possibility 
of their extra-ordinary actions. According 
to Schmitt, the exemplar paradigm of this 
is article 48 of the Weimar constitution, 
drafted in August 1919. The article says: 
“In case public safety is seriously threatened 
or disturbed, the Reich President may take 
the measures necessary to re-establish law 
and order, if necessary using armed force. 
In the pursuit of this aim, he may suspend 
the civil rights described in articles 114, 
115, 117, 118, 123, 124 and 154, partially 
or entirely”. It is interesting to note the 
fields these articles belong to: personal 
freedom, inviolability of the home, secrecy 
of correspondence, freedom of expression, 
freedom of assembly. It appears clear that 
during the crisis, which determines a state 
of emergency and exception, what is at 
stake is the possibility to invade the most 
intimate and private parts of the life of ev-
erybody, including their bodies and physical 
existence. The fact that article 48 does not 
consider a time limit for the suspension of 
the juridical order highlights the paradoxi-
cal structure of the exception condition. 
Although it represents the last possibility to 
restore the order after a conflictive crisis, it 
actually appears to be the incubation of the 
constituent power (that becomes a property 
of the president of the Reich who, almost 
paradoxically, becomes the “guardian” of 
the Constitution) through the confusion 
between commissary and sovereign dicta-
torship. This confusion generates a “grey 
area” in which the distinction between 
pure factuality and juridical order collapses, 
as the two constantly merge one onto the 
other. It is not a case if the Nazi regime was 
said to be a permanent state of exception 
that lasted 12 years, from 1933 to 1945.
Decision and sovereign power
These considerations allow us to access one of 
the most famous works by Schmitt, Politische 
Theologie, published in 1922, right one year 
after his text about dictatorship. The famous 
incipit says: “Sovereign is he who decides on 
the exception” (Schmitt 1985: 11). To avoid 
the violent affirmation of the power and 
the negation of the legitimate power which 
historically belong to the phenomenon of 
the dictatorship, Schmitt established an 
indissoluble bond between the possibility of 
concretely take action in a state of exception 
and the existence of a sovereign authority. 
By doing this, Schmitt theorizes, or maybe 
discovers, the deepest root of the sovereign 
power, some sort of loop that dangerously 
resembles a vicious circle1: the sovereign is 
1 Please note that the “looping nature” of 
Schmitt’s definition emerges only when it 
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he who can take concrete actions between a 
state of exception, thus solving the critical 
and conflictive situation which originated 
it; but at the same time he is the one who 
actually gives life to the state of exception, i.e. 
creates the condition in which the existence 
of the sovereign power is jeopardized. The 
paradox of the sovereignty structure Schmitt 
proposed is analyzed in detail by Giorgio 
Agamben:
The situation created in the exception has 
the peculiar characteristic that it cannot 
be defined either as a situation of fact or as 
a situation of right, but instead institutes 
a paradoxical threshold of indistinction 
between the two. It is not a fact, since it is 
only created through the suspension of the 
rule. But, for the same reason, it is not even 
a juridical case in point, even if it opens the 
possibility of the force of law (Agamben 
2005: 23).
In this relation, it is interesting to men-
tion Karl Löwith’s critique of Schmitt’s 
decisionism. In his essay Der okkasionelle 
Dezisionismus von Carl Schmitt, Löwith 
reproached the thinker of being unable to 
distinguish between decision and occasion, 
a category that Schmitt himself had severely 
criticized in Politische Romantik (Schmitt 
1968). If the extreme resort of the Political 
is the concrete sovereign decision, then 
“Schmitt’s decision […] is nothing but a 
decision towards resolution” (Löwith 1994: 
137). We also mention that the sovereign 
decision in a normal condition is, accord-
is balanced and crystallized in a formula. 
Schmitt actually talks about a legitimization 
of the exercise of the sovereign power that 
makes reference to the secularization of the 
power apparatuses that follow the religious 
doctrine of the divine power (Schmitt 1984). 
ing to Schmitt, a tyrannical action that has 
no justification. All the same, in spite of a 
certain superficiality, Löwith’s critique is 
not far from the proposal of this essay. The 
perverse ontological circle of exception and 
sovereignty finds its nourishment in the 
confusion between the formality of the ex-
ception category and the personalism of the 
concrete act of deciding, so that to a total 
indeterminacy correspond concrete acts of 
control of the individuals’ life and bodies, 
a condition in which, always according to 
Agamben, our society seems to be living. If 
we want to interrupt this circle and prevent 
the “decision for the decision” to assume the 
original form of the political dimension, it 
is necessary to ontologically re-consider the 
concept of decision itself and to renounce to 
the crisis vocabulary, which we will try to do 
in this work. Deciding, i.e. the concretiza-
tion of a will in response to a state of crisis, 
reflects the Aristotelian dialectic between 
potency and act exposed in the Theta book 
of the Metaphysics. This means overcoming 
the historic contingency that determines 
the concrete possibility of sovereign deci-
sion and analyzing instead its ontological 
structure through the concepts of potency 
and act. Before doing so, it is necessary to 
clarify Schmitt’s dialectic between decision 
and sovereignty, most of all recalling the 
dialogue from the distance between Schmitt 
and Benjamin. It is well known that the 
concept of “state of exception”, which Ben-
jamin (2010) explained in the eighth thesis 
about the concept of history, written in the 
late Forties shortly before killing himself, 
comes from Schmitt’s work. To the “state 
of exception” turned into the standard, the 
tradition of oppression taught us that it is 
necessary to compare the authentic state of 
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exception and to start a work of historical 
research that allows the creation of this new 
condition. It is probably less known that the 
authentic battlefield between the two is the 
concept of  “decision”. If Politische Theologie 
was completely aimed at pointing out the 
sovereign power as the place for the unique, 
authentic and legitimate decision, in Benja-
min’s work dedicated to the Trauerspiel, the 
situation reverses completely. Discussing 
the baroque German drama, Benjamin 
chooses a philosophically decisive option: 
he puts the character of the sovereign in 
the aesthetical dimension of the Baroque, 
defining him as he who “holds the course 
of history in his hand like a scepter” (Ben-
jamin 1963: 54), and underlining that this 
concept of sovereign belongs to some sort of 
no-man’s land where the juridical theory of 
the State and theater fiction combine. What 
radically differs in Schmitt and Benjamin’s 
perspectives is that here the sovereign is by 
definition unable to make a decision:
The antithesis between the power of the 
ruler and his capacity to rule led to a feature 
peculiar to the Trauerspiel which is, however, 
only apparently a generic feature and which 
can be illuminated only against the back-
ground of the theory of sovereignty. This is 
the indecisiveness of the tyrant. The prince, 
who is responsible for making the decision to 
proclaim the state of exception, reveals, at the 
first opportunity, that he is almost incapable 
of making a decision (Benjamin 1963: 62).
Benjamin’s analysis reveals what the 
real nature of the sovereign power is, the 
same one that Schmitt identified in the 
authentic deciding ability as we have 
seen already. Just like in the Baroque art 
the jewels, trinkets and frills are showed 
off to fight the fear of emptiness and to 
“fill” the space, in the juridical theory the 
sovereign becomes nothing but a sham, a 
theater put-on to hide the nothingness that 
feeds the juridical and political power. The 
pneumatic vacuum that allows the power 
to work in the decision-making process is 
legitimate only in the glorious form of a 
theater power whose inconsistency survived 
exclusively thanks to the applauses of the 
public that had come to see the play. Ben-
jamin’s consideration must have impressed 
Schmitt, as in the end of Hamlet oder 
Hekuba (Schmitt 1958b) the author makes 
an excursus about Benjamin’s text regarding 
the Trauerspiel. Nevertheless, the discussion 
was focused more on Benjamin’s analysis of 
Shakespeare, a big part of which, as Schmitt 
himself declared, is quite obscure. The sym-
bolic gauntlet of non-decision-making went 
void, maybe due to the candid admission 
of Schmitt who in Verfassungslehre declared 
how important the secularization of the ap-
paratus of power glorification was: “public 
opinion is the modern form of acclamation” 
(Schmitt 1983: 244). And still, from the 
theoretical point of view that goes beyond 
the textual debate between two intellectu-
als, Benjamin’s perspective opens a field of 
research that, more than “decision”, invites 
to deepen and exploit indecision and to 
make it the ultimate term of the analysis of 
power by developing all the inconsistency, 
the vacuity, and the irrationality of its 
concrete forms.
The scrivener and the camel
In the final part of his essay, through some 
suggestions proposed by the Italian phi-
losopher Giorgio Agamben, I will propose 
two characters of indecision that certainly 
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do not end the debate on the theme but 
may strengthen some characteristics that 
normally, due to the “crisis terminology” 
we are used to, are not considered. The first 
one is Bartleby the scrivener, protagonist of 
a short story of Herman Melville (Weaver 
1956). Agamben analyzed this story as he 
thought it to be the paradigm of an onto-
logical analysis of decision and sovereignty. 
The second character comes from a legend 
which is said to belong to the famous Mul-
lah Nassr Eddin.
The plot of Melville’s story is well- 
-known. The mysterious Bartleby, a precise, 
punctual and scrupulous law scrivener, 
suddenly starts to answer all the requests of 
his employer with an enigmatic “I would 
prefer not to”. To understand the real 
challenge of this formula, i.e. an authentic 
anthropological mutation, it is necessary to 
recall Agamben’s thesis according to which 
the problem of sovereignty is nothing but 
the Aristotelian problem of the act-potency 
dialectic. This implies revoking something 
like the coincidence between “sovereignty” 
and power’s autonomy, which is the 
possibility-not-to. In spite of the difficulties 
of the Aristotelian texts we will not focus on 
in this work, we can take as the core point of 
the Theta volume of the Metaphysics the will 
to maintain the potency as something that 
exists autonomously. This effort is particu-
larly evident in the Aristotelian critique of 
the Megarian doctrine, according to which 
the potency exists only in act. In the same 
way, shifted in an explicitly political vo-
cabulary, the distinction between constitu-
ent and constituted power – a milestone of 
Schmitt’s thought – can be resumed in the 
potency–act dialectic. In other words, the 
effort to think about politics independently 
from the concept of sovereignty and, as a 
consequence, from the concept of deciding 
coincides with the attempt of conceiving an 
ontology in which the existence of potency 
has no relation at all with the act. In an 
important work of his, Toni Negri tried 
to point out the absolute antithetic of the 
relationship between constituent power 
(pure potency) and sovereignty:
Sovereignty […] is a foundation contrary to 
constituent power; it is a summit, whereas 
constituent power is a basis. It is an accom-
plished finality, whereas constituent power 
is unfinalized; it implies a limited time and 
space, whereas constituent power implies 
a multidirectional plurality of times and 
spaces; it is a rigidified formal constitution, 
whereas constituent power is absolute process 
(Negri 1992: 22).
Negri marks out that the ontological 
roots of the constituent power are nothing 
but the consideration that “constitutive 
strength never ends up as power” (Negri 
1992: 23). It is Spinoza’s pretention (Negri 
1981) that human, social and political 
nature can coincide with the autonomy of 
its absolute power. This happens because, 
as Negri further says, given that the con-
stituent power is “the radical apparatus 
of something that does not yet exist”, it 
cannot end up in the constituted power 
which appears to be an ordinate and closed 
system and, finally, the radical negation 
of human freedom. Sovereignty, instead, 
represents the “fixing of constituent power, 
as its termination, as the exhaustion of the 
freedom that constituent power carries” 
(Negri 1992: 31). To avoid the constituent 
power to be fixed and reduced through 
the sovereign power into a constituted 
power, the politic task is to preserve the 
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constituent power as an endless, open 
process, an eternal “act of creation”, that 
widens the horizons and gives birth to a 
new life condition. The theoretical horizon 
this task is framed within is the ontological 
one: the human power that turns into a 
constituent power calls for its survival in 
the absence (also interpretable in the form 
of the “desire”, so much indeed that René 
Girard could build the theory of the “désir 
métaphysique” by developing the idea of 
a desire without an object, of a desire that 
is a constitutive lack and negativity of the 
human being (Girard 1978)). Nevertheless, 
this permanence can be understood only 
if the Aristotelian position according to 
which “everything that has a power can be 
and not be” is taken as valid. In this case, 
the power is always defined in relation to 
the “power-not-to”.
This is precisely what Bartleby’s indeci-
sion, his balance between yes and no, tries 
to do. More in detail, what Bartleby radi-
cally rejects is the fact that a decision, i.e. 
the manifestation of a will to do or not 
to do, resolves the problem of the passage 
from the potency to the act, the fact itself 
that we can conceive as “will” eliminating 
“pure potency”. In other words, Bartleby’s 
experiment, his way of remaining in a 
“zone of indiscernibility or indetermination 
between some non-preferred activities and 
a preferable activity” (Deleuze 1993: 92), 
radically attacks Schmitt’s lapidary affirma-
tion according to which “Sovereign is he 
who decides on the exception”. If the state 
of exception here is taken as the power, 
or more Leibniz-likely as the possible 
world (or like the more recent prospective 
proposed by Massimo Cacciari (1990)), 
the passage to the action carries out a 
possible world and makes what may seem 
impossible. In this sense, the decision is 
renouncing to the power and abandoning 
the mythic forces of power, i.e. renouncing 
to resist its concreteness that materializes in 
specific forms. Agamben writes: “It is not 
that he does not want to copy or that he 
does not want to leave the office; he simply 
would prefer not to. The formula that he so 
obstinately repeats destroys all possibility of 
constructing a relation between being able 
and willing” (Agamben 1993: 65).
The second figure I would like to propose 
as a paradigm of non-decision which comes 
from an ancient Sufi legend. Kristupas 
Sabolius has recently spoken about it in his 
book dedicated to the imaginary. 
There is a notorious story about Mullah 
Nasreddin who managed to unravel the 
complicated case of an asymmetrical legacy. 
They say a very rich man died and left his 
children a message stating that the first son 
would get half, the second would get one 
third and the last would get one ninth of 
the property. Everything went fine except 
the problem involving 17 camels. One 
cannot divide this number according to the 
indicated proportions, unless one camel 
would be cut into pieces. That is why the 
children came to Nasreddin, and he offered 
a solution. He lent one camel, so there would 
be 18 of them. The first son would get 9, or 
a half of the wealth. The second would get 
6 camels, or one third. The youngest child 
would get 2 camels, which would be one 
ninth. There would be one camel left, the 
same one which belonged to Nasreddin, so 
they could give his camel back to its owner 
(Sabolius 2013: 245).
What happens in this little mathemati-
cal trick? Nothing but the passage from a 
situation in which it is impossible to decide 
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without applying a certain amount of 
violence (like cutting the camel) to a situ-
ation in which the decision is taken in an 
absolutely pacific way, under the admired 
glance of the whole village. Nevertheless, 
this passage is made possible only by the 
appearance of an external, imaginary agent 
that was not there before. An irrational 
decision turns rational thanks to an element 
that does not belong to the given context, 
an element that, once the non-decision-
making of the situation has been resolved, 
can be also rejected. This paradoxical 
situation presents the irrational character 
of every decision, an irrationality that 
Schmitt’s thesis about the state of exception 
not only allowed, but also legitimated, as it 
enclosed the decision-making action in the 
frame of  an extra-ordinary condition. As 
a matter of fact, every “decision”, i.e. every 
voluntary passage from a potential to an 
actual situation is either not a decision – 
as it comes from a more or less conscious 
calculation that leads to a solution which is 
only apparently the result of a free choice of 
the individual or is either obtained through 
irrational elements that do not belong to 
the given context, whose appearance is so 
perturbing that must be deleted afterwards, 
like in the case of the eighteenth camel. 
Derrida had already found an aporetic situ-
ation in decision-making: “The undecidable 
is the experience of that which, though 
heterogeneous, foreign to the order of the 
calculable and the rule, is still obliged to 
give itself up to the impossible decision” 
(Derrida 1990: 963). 
If the impossibility to decide is perfectly 
expressed by the legend of Mullah Nassr 
Eddin, the result of the abandon to the 
impossible decision is a prerogative of 
Bartleby’s. By categorically refusing the 
passage from the purely potential condition 
to the action, Bartleby finds himself in a 
position of suspension that breaks the bond 
between decision-making and sovereignty 
Schmitt had theorized. The semantic uni-
verse of the crisis we are in since long ago 
convinces us that the political paradigm is 
“decision-making”. In Italy, for instance, 
good politicians are positively referred to 
as “uomo del fare”, decision-making man, 
an expression that is as ridiculous as po-
litically dangerous. To set us free from the 
vocabulary of the crisis, which conditions 
our actions and our political strategies, it 
is necessary to turn to the protagonists of 
suspensions, to those characters who do not 
exercise power because they do not decide, 
and through their constitutive indecision 
they break the plot of sovereignty that, 
from Hobbes to our days, has been ruling 
the political thought of the Western world. 
This is what I believe the paradoxical task of 
a theoretical and political reflection about 
the crisis should be, even during crisis.
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KRIZĖ, (NEAPSI)SPRENDIMAS? NUO CARLO SCHMITTO PRIE RAŠTININKO BARTLBIO
Ernesto Calogero Sferrazza Papa
Santrauka
Straipsnyje nagrinėjama „sprendimo“ sąvokos sąsaja su „krizės“ sąvoka Carlo Schmitto mąstyme. 
Pirmoje straipsnio dalyje, pasitelkus jo pagrindinių knygų Diktatūra (1921) ir Politinė teologija 
(1921) analizę, mėginama parodyti, kodėl Schmittas gali būti laikomas „krizės mąstytoju“. An-
troje straipsnio dalyje pagrindžiama, kodėl sąvokos „krizė“ ir „sprendimas“ Schmitto doktrinoje 
yra susijusios. Paskutinėje straipsnio dalyje mėginama imtis Schmitto decizionizmui priešingos 
skaitymo strategijos pasitelkus du literatūrinius personažus – raštininką Bartlby ir mulą Nasre-
diną. Šioje straipsnio dalyje taip pat svarstoma, ar Giorgio Agambeno galios teorija gali pasiūlyti 
adekvačią atsvarą politikoje vyraujančiai decizionistinei prieigai. Autorius siekia parodyti, kaip 
neapsisprendimu, svyravimu besiremianti prieiga gali atsisakyti „krizės“, kurioje gyvena mūsų 
visuomenė, žodyno. 
Pagr indinia i  žodžia i : Carl Schmitt, krizė, sprendimas, galia, Giorgio Agamben.
